







How Metaphysical is “Deepening the Foundations”?  – Hahn and Frank on Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method 
Only recently has David Hilbert’s program to axiomatize the sciences according to the pattern of geometry left the shade of his formalist program in the founda​tions of mathematics.​[1]​ This relative neglect – which is surprising in view of the enormous efforts Hilbert himself had devoted to it – was certainly in​fluenced by Logical Empiricists’ almost exclusively focusing on his contribu​tions to the foundational debates. Ulrich Majer puts part of the blame for this neglect on Hilbert himself because “he failed to make his position sufficiently clear, and he did not take much effort to promote his views beyond the narrow circle of mathematical physics in Göttingen.” ​[2]​
This might excuse Schlick and Carnap who are the protagonists of Majer’s paper. But two other core members of the Vienna Circle had studied with Hilbert and continued to work on topics close to his circle, such as variational calculus and relativity theory. The mathematician Hans Hahn spent the winter semester 1903/4 at Göttingen, and the theoretical physicist Philipp Frank went there in the summer of 1906. For the winter term 1903/4, the catalogue of the university lists lectures on “The concept of number and the quadrature of the circle”, the “Theory of partial differential equations” and “Exercises on algebra and arith​metic” and “Exercises on the Theory of Differential Equations” (together with Minkowski).​[3]​ For Frank’s Göttingen semester there are a “Seminar on the theory of functions” (together with Klein and Minkowski) and lectures on “Continuum Mechanics” and “Differential and Integral Calculus I ” (together with Carathéodory). It seems safe to assume that Frank attended Hilbert’s lecture on continuum mechanics.​[4]​
After 1908, Frank would quickly become one of the leading early researchers on Einstein’s relativity theory, such that he certainly was aware of Hilbert’s 1915 “The Foundations of Physics” – a text of which Majer does not find any sub​stantial mention in Schlick’s work. And at least from the days of his Ph.D. dissertation Frank knew enough about variational calculus to understand the technical side of Hilbert’s reasoning. Hahn even was one of the leading figures in variational calculus; together with Ernst Zermelo he was entrusted with the respective entry for the Encyclopedia of Mathematical Sciences.​[5]​
Thus for Hahn and Frank, more substantial factors than sheer neglect must have prevented a due appreciation of Hilbert’s program of the axiomatization of the sciences, factors which revealed a basic difference in attitude towards mathematical physics. At the bottom of this difference – so I shall argue – stands their conviction that reconciling Ernst Mach’s empiricist heritage with modern mathematics required drawing a rigid boundary between mathematics and phys​ics and subscribing to logicism, according to which mathematics consisted in tautologous logical transformations. In this way, and similar to their fellow Circle members studied by Majer, Hahn and Frank missed the substantial differ​ence between the logical structure of a particular axiom system and the axi​o​matic method as a critical study of arbitrary axiom systems. If this distinction is not properly observed – and admittedly Hilbert himself did deliberately obscure it at places – a core concept of the axiomatic method, “deepening the founda​tions” (Tieferlegung), becomes metaphysical because it might appear as an on​tological reduction of basic physical concepts to mathematical ones rather than – as Hilbert intended – an epistemological reduction availing itself of the unity of mathematical knowledge. 
To be sure, Logical Empiricists considered the goal of axiomatizing the sciences an important task, but in the way they set it up axiomatization became much more closely tied to a success of the foundationalist program for all mathematics than Hilbert’s axiomatic method ever was. Because of this relative independence from the foundationalist program, the process of “deepening the foundations” can be interpreted in a much more pragmatic fashion than in Hilbert. But this was done only in the 1950s by John von Neumann who more than anybody else contributed to putting Hilbert’s axiomatization program to work.​[6]​
I shall, however, focus on the discussions of the 1930s, in particular because Hilbert’s 1930 address “Logic and the Knowledge of Nature” received a highly critical answer from his former student Hahn. Frank later even feared that calling modern physics mathematical would give way to a return of spiritual and teleo​logical elements in science. Consequently, Hahn and Frank avoided almost any reference to the philosophical connotations of the Principle of Least Action which figured so prominently in Hilbert’s axiomatizations because this principle, and variational calculus as a whole, had frequently been interpreted as a teleo​logical element within the foundations of physics proper. Against this backdrop it becomes clear why Logical Empiricists were not at all pleased by Hilbert’s constant assertions that a (non-Leibnizian) pre-established harmony linked physics and mathematics, a harmony that was revealed by successfully “deep​ening the foundations”. In the fourth section I shall analyze the various meanings of this rather wooly concept and investigate which of them could have been palatable to Logical Empiricists, had wording and philosophical heritage not blatantly opposed one of their battle cries: “In science there are no ‘depths’; there is surface everywhere.” ​[7]​


1. Hilbert’s Königsberg Address
In the autumn of 1930, the biennial meeting of the German Society of Natural Scientists and Physicians took place in Hilbert’s native city of Königsberg. During the opening session he delivered his last major public lecture on “Logic and the Knowledge of Nature”.​[8]​ It is sometimes seen as one of history’s ironies that at a small meeting adjoined to the congress, the young Viennese mathema​tician Kurt Gödel presented a proof that Hilbert’s foundationalist program that was intended to justify his optimism about the solvability of every well-formu​lated mathematical problem, was unfeasible. 
But Hilbert’s talk was not primarily about foundations. It set out by ob​serving that in the three decades since he had presented his 23 “Mathematical Problems” ​[9]​ to the International Congress of Mathematicians in 1900, scientists had witnessed an unbroken chain of discoveries that put them in a position to confidently face “an old philosophical problem, namely, the much disputed question about the share which thought, on the one hand, and experience, on the other, have in our knowledge.” ​[10]​ This, of course, had been the core theme of the genius loci Immanuel Kant.
Not only have the technique of experimentation and the art of erecting theoretical edifices in physics attained new heights, but their counterpart, the science of logic, has also made substantial progress. Today there is a general method for the theoretical treatment of questions in the natural sciences, which in every case facilitates the precise formulation of the problem and helps prepare its solution – namely, the axiomatic method.​[11]​
After alluding to the model of Euclidean geometry, Hilbert gives a biological example and claims that “the laws of heredity [of the fly drosophila] result as an application of the axioms of linear congruence, that is, of the marking-off of intervals.” ​[12]​ Although it is not clear to me what Hilbert precisely had in mind, this example teaches us that his program was not at all limited to well-entrenched fields of physics. Axiomatization could prove fertile also in preliminary or merely phenomenological theories, and Hilbert himself published an axiomatic treatment of Kirchhoff’s law of radiation that was – even in those days – not considered as the last word on atomic processes. This lead to a polemic between Hilbert and the experimentalist Ernst Pringsheim. Max Born – who had been an assistant to Hilbert – attempts reconciliation:
[B]eing conscious of the infinite complexity he faces in every experiment [the physicist] refuses to consider any theory as final. Therefore … he abhors the word ‘axiom’ to which common use clings the sense of final truth. Yet the mathematician does not deal with the factual happenings, but with logical relations; and in Hilbert’s terms the axiomatic treat​ment of a discipline does not signify the final assertion of certain axioms as eternal truths, but the methodological requirement: state your assumptions at the beginning of your con​siderations, stick to them, and investigate whether these assumptions are not partially superfluous or even mutually inconsistent.​[13]​
Hence, one can conclude with Majer that 
[f]rom an axiomatic point of view … the macroscopic-phenomenological approach is logically just as suited for an axio​matic investigation as the microscopic-molecular one. This shows that both points of views, the axiomatic and the foundational one, are not identical and can be pursued quite inde​pen​dently. Hilbert, however, for the most time in his life had both aims in mind.​[14]​
In a certain sense, the axiomatic method was even more powerful in this case than for a final theory because here one could analyze more alternative models. Let me quote a longer passage from the introduction to his second lecture on the mechanics of continua in the winter term of 1906/7, the first part of which Frank almost certainly attended.
As goal of mathematical physics we can perhaps describe, to treat also all not purely me​chanical phenomena according to the model of point mechanics; hence … on the basis of Ha​milton’s principle, perhaps after ap​propriately generalizing it. Physics has … already gained brilliant successes in this direction …
Even if the keen hypotheses, which have been made in the realm of mole​cular phys​ics, sometimes certainly come close to the truth because the pre​dictions are often con​firmed in a surprising manner, one has to characterize the achievements still as small and often as rather insecure, be​cause the hypotheses are in many cases still in need of supple​mentation and they some​times fail completely. … Such considerations recommend it as advisable to ta​ke meanwhile a completely different, yet a directly opposite path in the treat​ment of physics – as it indeed has happened. Namely, one tries from the start to pro​duce as little detailed ideas as possible of the physical process, but fixes instead only its general parameters, which determine its exter​nal development; then one can by axio​matic physical assumptions determine the form of the Lagrangian function L as function of the parameters and their differential quo​tients. If the development is given by the minimal principle t1 t2L dt = Min., then we can infer ge​neral properties of the state of motion solely from the assumptions with respect to the form of L, without any closer knowledge of the processes …
In order to give … an intuition of the new approach I refer to the theory of elasticity, which treats the deformations of solid bodies caused by the mu​tual influence and dis​placements of the molecules; we will have to re​nounce a detailed description of the mo​lec​ular processes and instead only look for the parameters from which the measurable state of deformation of the body depends at each place. Then one has to determine the form of dependence of the Lagrangian function from these parameters which is, properly speaking, composed of the kinetic and potential energy of the single molecules. … The prese​ntation of physics just in​dicated, … which permits the deduction of essential state​ments from formal assumptions about L, shall be the core of my lecture.​[15]​
But in Hilbert’s Königsberg talk this subtle distinction between final and (tran​sitory) phenomenological theories was not mentioned. Rather did Hilbert believe that physical science had already reached its mathematical foundations to such an extent that one could draw philosophical conclusions.​[16]​
“[I]nfinite” has no intuitive meaning and … without more detailed investigation it has absolutely no sense. For everywhere there are only finite things. There is no infinite speed, and no force or effect (Wirkung) that propagates itself infinitely fast. Moreover, the action (Wirkung) is itself of a discrete nature and exists only in quanta. There is nothing that can be divided infinitely often. Even light has atomic structure, just like the quanta of action. I firmly believe that even space is only of finite extent, and one day astronomers will be able to tell us how many kilometers long, high and broad it is.​[17]​
Here we obtain the first parallelism between nature and thought: “the infinite is nowhere realized; it neither occurs in nature nor is it admissible as a foundation in our thought without special precautions.” ​[18]​ As to the second parallelism, “our thought intends unity and seeks to form unity; we observe the unity of material in matter and we everywhere detect the unity of the laws of nature. This nature in reality greatly accommodates us in our research.” ​[19]​ Here Hilbert is not far from the Kantian regulative principle of subjective formal teleology (Zweckmäßigkeit) that directs our judgment to investigate particular empirical laws according to a “unity such as they would have if an understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experience according to particular natural laws.” ​[20]​ Against this back​drop, it is not altogether surprising that pre-established harmony turns out to be the third parallelism, where Hilbert takes the expression in another sense than Leibniz. This allusion was not really new. Already in 1900 Hilbert had found that “the apparently pre-established harmony which the mathematician so often perceives in the questions, methods and ideas of the various branches of his science, originates in this ever-recurring interplay between thought and reason.” ​[21]​ In 1930 he looked back to what he had attempted in the field of general relativity. 
Here solely through the general demand for invariance together with the principle of greatest simplicity the differential equations for the gravitational potentials are con​structed with mathematical uniqueness. This construction would not have been possible without the profound and difficult mathematical investigations of Riemann, which existed long before.​[22]​
What Hilbert does not say here is that he had to take back a substantial part of his aspirations at a unified field theory, a goal which stood behind his paper’s ambi​tious title “The Foundations of Physics”. Not only was his model for matter much too special, but the idea “that a reduction of all physical constants to mathematical constants should be possible” ​[23]​ had to be dropped because a major theorem of the first version had to be weakened to what today is known as Noether’s second theorem. 
The next example in Hilbert’s Königsberg address, the foundations of quan​tum mechanics, would enjoy a better fate, mainly due to von Neumann’s book.​[24]​ Hilbert’s general conclusion mentions a key element of his axiomatic method, “elimination” (Elimination), which appears to me a new wording for what in his 1918 paper “Axiomatic thought” had figured under “deepening the foundations” (Tieferlegung) ​[25]​.
We can understand this agreement between nature and thought, between experiment and theory, only if we take into account both the formal element and the mechanism con​nected with it on both sides of nature and of our understanding. The mathematical process of elimination furnishes, it seems, the resting-points and stations where both the bodies in the real world and the thoughts in the mental world linger and, in this way, present them​selves for control and comparison. 
But this pre-established harmony does not yet exhaust the relations between nature and thought, and does not yet uncover the deepest secrets of our problem … [M]odern science shows that the present actual state of physical matter on earth and in space is not accidental or arbitrary, but follows from the laws of physics.​[26]​
Hilbert sees the specter of Hegelian Naturphilosophie rising and avowedly reverts from it: “For what is the origin of the laws of the world? How do we acquire them? And who teaches us that they fit reality? The answer is, that experience alone makes this possible.” ​[27]​ So far this is quite in line with a Kantian position.
Now I admit that already for the construction of the theoretical frameworks (Fachwerke) certain a priori insights are necessary … I also believe that mathematical knowledge in the end rests on a kind of intuitive insight of this sort, and even that we need a certain a priori outlook for the construction of number theory. Thus the most general and most fundamental idea of the Kantian epistemology retains its significance: namely the philosophical problem of determining a priori that intuitive outlook and thereby of in​vesti​gating the condition of the possibility of all conceptual knowledge and of every experience … But we must draw the boundary between what we possess a priori and what requires experience differently than Kant: Kant greatly overestimated the role and the extent of the a priori.​[28]​
The classical case in point for the demise of the synthetic a priori was, of course, relativity theory. Hilbert concludes that “the Kantian theory of the a priori still contains anthropological dross from which it must be liberated; afterwards only the a priori attitude is left over which also underlies pure mathematical knowl​edge: essentially it is the finite attitude which I have characterized in several works.” ​[29]​
Looking back to Hilbert’s earlier remarks about the impossibility of infinities in physics, one gets the impression that he himself had overestimated the role of the post-Kantian a priori in physics. At any rate, Hilbert’s aim never was to jus​tify Kantianism but to argue for the central role of mathematics within the sciences. “The instrument that mediates between theory and practice, between thought and observation, is mathematics.” ​[30]​ Or: “We have not mastered a theory in the natural sciences until we have extracted and fully revealed its mathemati​cal core. Without mathematics, modern astronomy and physics would not be possible; these sciences, in their theoretical parts, almost dissolve into mathe​matics.” ​[31]​ Certainly, this was not what Logical Empiricists liked to hear from one of their idols​[32]​, even more as it was so tightly linked to the Kantian a priori. 
2. Hans Hahn’s Response to a Former Teacher
In 1933, a small booklet entitled Logic, Mathematics, and Knowledge of Nature authored by Hahn appeared as the second volume of the series Einheitswissen​schaft (Unified Science). Although Hilbert’s name does not appear in the book​let, its title openly alludes to his widely-read lecture. Hahn also responds on the stylistic level. While Hilbert concludes with the separately printed lines “We must know, We shall know” ​[33]​, Hahn reverberated the motto of Boltzmann’s Mechanics: “Put forward what is true; / Write so as to make it clear, / And de​fend it to the end!” ​[34]​ 
There is, however, little need for circumstantial evidence because Hahn directly addresses the main topic of Hilbert’s talk, the relationship between thought and reality. After a brief historical tour through the philosophical views of empiricism and rationalism, Hahn comes to the point.
The usual view [concerning the relationship in question] can then be described like this: from experience we gather certain facts and formulate them as “laws of nature”; but since by thought we apprehend the most general lawlike connections in reality (of a logical and mathematical nature), our mastery over nature on the basis of facts we have gathered by observation extends much further than our actual observations; for we also know that everything that can be inferred from what we have observed by applying logic and mathematics must be real. … This view seems to find a powerful support in the numerous discoveries made in a theoretical manner … 
But we are nevertheless of the opinion that this view is completely untenable. For upon closer reflection it appears that the role of thought is incomparably more modest than the role ascribed to it on this view. The view that thought provides us with a means of knowing more about the world than we observed, of knowing what must be uncondi​tionally valid always and everywhere in the world, a means of apprehending general laws of being, this view seems to us thoroughly mysterious. … Why should what is compelling to our thought also be compelling to the course of the world? Our only recourse would be to believe in a miraculous pre-established harmony between the course of our thought and the course of the world, an idea which is deeply mystical and ultimately theological.​[35]​
Here we find the main charge against Hilbert: professing the faith of a pre-established harmony amounts to mysticism. To be sure, Hilbert had emphasized that our knowledge of natural laws is of empirical origin, but Hahn required a firmer stand and continues:
There seems to be no other way out of this situation than a return to a pure empiricist position, a return to the view that observation is the only source of our knowledge of facts: there is no factual knowledge a priori, no “material” a priori. Only we must avoid the mistake of earlier empiricists who would see nothing but empirical facts in the pro​po​sitions of logic and mathematics; we must look around for a different view of logic and mathematics.​[36]​
To Hahn’s mind, the only way to reconcile a consistent empiricism with modern mathematics is to deny any reality to the concepts of logic and mathematics, and regard them merely as conventions about the use of the symbols of a formal language. They “say nothing about objects and are for this reason certain, uni​versally valid, and irrefutable by observation.” ​[37]​
[T]hough logical propositions are purely tautological, and though logical inferences are nothing but tautological transformations, they are nevertheless significant for us because we are not omniscient. Our language is made in such a way that in asserting certain propositions we implicitly assert other propositions – but we do not see right away all the things we have implicitly asserted, and only logical inference makes us conscious of them.​[38]​
In view of Hilbert’s argument that our limited cognitive faculties require an a priori finitist attitude, Hahn’s reference to our lack of omniscience is puzzling because assuming that the class of all possible systems of scientific tautologies is a meaningful concept one might argue that this cognitive limitation amounts to an a priori argument for our need to choose special systems by convention.
Surprisingly, Hahn is still convinced that the logicist foundations of mathe​matics can be rigorously proven – even three years after his student Gödel’s incompleteness results. “Of course, the proof of the tautological character of mathematics is not yet complete on all points; we are here faced with a trouble​some and difficult problem; yet we have no doubt that the view that mathematics is tautological is essentially correct.” ​[39]​ In a paper published three years earlier, Hahn had simply denied that there was any space for Hilbert’s foundationalist program.
As regards Hilbert’s formalism, what must be pointed out from our point of view is above all the unexplained role of metamathematical considerations. What is the origin of claims to metamathematical knowledge? It is certainly not experience! The difficulties we men​tioned in speaking of attempts to base logic and mathematics on experience militate against this. Are they logical transformations? Certainly not! For they are supposed to serve as justifications for these transformations. What, then, are they? However, in adopting this sceptical position towards Hilbert’s point of departure we do not mean to say anything against the significance of his investigations. On the contrary, I am con​vinced that many of Hilbert’s concrete results will enter into the continuation and improvement of Russell’s system.​[40]​
Two pages before Hahn had called it a major virtue of the logicist view that “the problem of … the seemingly pre-established harmony between thought and world” ​[41]​ dissolves. Interestingly, Hahn seems to believe that only after this rigorous separation can the axiomatization of the sciences fully thrive because all theorems become tautological implications of freely chosen assumptions.
Some chapters of physics have already been axiomatized in the same sense as geometry and turned thereby into special chapters of the theory of relations. Yet they remain chap​ters of physics and hence of an empirical and factual science because the basic concepts that occur in them are constituted out of the given.
In doing this we may have the following goal in mind: to set up an axiomatic system by which the whole of physics is logicized and incorporated into the theory of relations. If we do this, it may well turn out that, as the axiomatic systems become more comprehen​sive, … their basic concepts become increasingly remote from reality and are connected with the given by increasingly longer, increasingly more complicated constitutive chains. All we can do is state this fact, as a peculiarity of the given; but there is no bridge that leads from here to the assertion that behind the sensible world there lies a second, ‘real’ world enjoying an independent being.​[42]​
Here another anathema of Logical Empiricism appears, the meaningless meta​physical question about the external world. That Hahn fears this danger is only possible because he assumes the extension of a single (but arbitrarily chosen) axiomatic system of all physics to go hand in hand with conceptual reduction and unification.
Hahn’s concept of axiomatization differs from Hilbert’s in three respects. First, all basic concepts appear to be on a par within a network of logical re​la​tions that covers all of unified science. What Hilbert considered as “deepening the foundations”, on Hahn’s account, was just choosing a more economical con​vention. Second, the constitution of the basic mathematical concepts excludes any intuitive justification of mathematical concepts. In his paper “The Crisis of Intuition” ​[43]​, Hahn had listed many important concepts of modern mathematics that contradicted our intuition, for instance, non-Archimedian number fields. Hilbert could well have agreed to this criticism. But, intuition still played a sig​nificant role in his account precisely because our limited cognitive faculties required a finitist attitude. To be sure, Hahn did not charge Hilbert of relapsing into the infamous Kantian pure intuition as a basis of mathematics, but of placing metamathematics into the empty space between logical tautologies and empirical knowledge once occupied by it. Third, by considering any axiom system exclu​sively as a system of logical relations plus constitutive definitions of the basic concepts, Hahn made the axiomatic method much more dependent on the success of a foundational program for mathematics than Hilbert. 
The reason for Hahn’s separating so rigidly logic and mathematics from knowledge of nature had its roots in the Machian heritage, which had been much more important for the ‘Austrians’ in the Vienna Circle than for Schlick or Carnap. In his Mechanics, Mach had criticized Archimedes’ derivation of the law of the lever by means of Euclidean geometry because it implicitly pre​sup​posed factual knowledge that could only be attained by previous experiences.​[44]​ 
Hahn and his colleagues were aware that they had to take Boltzmann’s side in the atomism controversy. “Indeed the whole of science is full of propositions which cannot in principle be confirmed by observation because they contain un​constitutable terms; propositions about molecules, atoms, electrons, etc. are not the only propositions of this kind.” ​[45]​ Attributions of exact numerical values to physical quantities and the universal quantifier occurring in every law of nature belong to this class. 
Every time we introduce unconstitutable terms into science we must make sure that they are accompanied by directions for their use … And these rules must be such that we come in the end to propositions which can be immediately confirmed or refuted by observation. … Legitimate propositions of science with unconstitutable terms are comparable to ade​quately covered paper money which can be exchanged for gold at any time at the national bank – whereas metaphysical propositions are like uncovered paper money which is not accepted by anyone in exchange for either gold or goods.​[46]​
Present-day economists would consider such a restrictive monetary policy to severely hamper economic growth and they would take it rather as a symptom of crisis when people start cashing their banknotes for goods. Mutual support of various theories seems to be rather favorable for scientific growth; and this was a task which, to Hilbert’s mind, mathematics could accomplish in virtue of its remarkable internal cohesion.
Hahn, however, closely sticks to Mach by arguing “that there is not a single law of nature of which we know whether it holds or not; laws of nature are hypotheses which we state tentatively.” ​[47]​ By contrast, Boltzmann’s pictures – as he called theories in order to avoid realist metaphysics – were attempts at an epistemological reduction and unification. It appears to me that by granting Mach too much at this point Hahn had to fortify the boundary between logical tautologies and hypothetical empirical facts. 
3. Philipp Frank and the Principle of Least Action
In 1936 and within the same series as Hahn’s criticism, Frank published a book​let entitled The Fall of Mechanistic Physics. Its second chapter opposes the thesis that “the new physics is not mechanistic but mathematical.” ​[48]​ Frank’s targets are General Smuts and James Jeans who held that the fall of the mechanical world view and the rise of abstract mathematical entities lead to a return of spiritual elements within modern science, so that “the universe is now more like a great [organic] idea than a great machine.” ​[49]​ But, so Frank contends, whoever desires to find spiritual analogies will succeed both in classical and in modern physics. Hence, the “assertion that the new physics is not ‘mechanical’ but ‘mathemati​cal’ only means that the formulae of relativity and quantum mechanics contra​dict those of the old mechanics or to put it more precisely, agree with them only for small velocities and large masses.” ​[50]​
The laws of physics consist of mathematical relations between quantities, as well as of directions on how these quantities can be related to feasible observations, and in this respect nothing has changed even in the twentieth century. The equations have changed, the quantities are different, and the directions, too, are therefore no longer the same; but the general scheme according to which a physical theory is constructed still has the same fundamental character today as it had in Newton’s time.​[51]​ 
What Frank treated as “mathematical physics” hardly touched the core of Hilbert’s axiomatization program. 
Against the Principle of Least Action and variational calculus – which were the key tool in Hilbert’s axiomatizations of mechanics, continuum mechanics, and relativity theory – there existed even a long historical record of counts of metaphysical teleology, that was broadly discussed in Mach’s Mechanics. But in this case, Hahn and Frank remained virtually silent. This was rather surprising for a philosophically interested core researcher in the field. According to the historian Wilhelm Frank, “Hahn’s publications in this field … were very posi​tively reviewed in the contemporary journals and often constituted important steps in the development and the simplification of the methods of the calculus of variations.” ​[52]​
In Philipp Frank’s writings, one has slightly more success. His Ph.D. disser​tation of 1906 dealt with the problem of sufficient conditions for a minimum of the Principle of Least Action, a topic that was – as the author repeatedly stressed – typically absent from the treatises of mechanics including the one by his late teacher Boltzmann. That Frank wrote a physics thesis largely from a mathemati​cian’s perspective suggests that its topic was proposed by Hahn or Gustav von Escherich. Frank constantly attended their courses​[53]​, in particular Hahn’s maiden lectures on variational calculus in the summer term of 1905. In the introduction to his thesis, Frank argued that new mathematical results allowed one to radical​ize Carl Gustav Jacobi’s ametaphysical stance.
“It is difficult to find a metaphysical cause for the Principle of Least Action, if it is expressed in this true form, as is necessary. There exist minima of an entirely different type, from which one can also derive the differential equations of the motion, which in this respect are much more appealing.” ​[54]​
One can give the theorem an even more ametaphysical form than Jakobi’s [sic!] by saying: A material point moves according to the Lagrange equations appertaining to the variational problem . This casts off the last remnant of minimum-romance.​[55]​ 
In Frank’s philosophical works, the Principle of Least Action is almost absent. His seminal book The Law of Causality and Its Limits list it as an instance of “another widely spread manner of treating natural phenomena by analogy to human emotional life.” ​[56]​ Subsequently Frank repeats an example from his Ph.D. dissertation. For the ballistic throw one can prove that J (defined as above) attains a smaller value for a piecewise continuous curve lifting the ball vertically up to maximum height, then transporting it horizontally to a point above the endpoint and finally dropping it, than for that parabola which is the actual orbital curve. 
It is not at all characteristic for the orbit a point-mass follows that along that orbit any magnitude assumes its smallest value … Only a certain mathematical simplification is hidden in the minimal principles of mechanics. With its help the laws of the orbital curves can be expressed in fewer variables … This has, however, nothing to do with economical measures of nature, since such an expression exists for any group of curves, if only they obey differential equations.​[57]​
Once again Frank fears opening the door for anti-scientific ideas, in this case for a genuine material teleology within the biological sciences, an idea which he is at pains to criticize throughout the book. 
4. On Deepening the Foundations
Both Hahn and Frank thus separated Hilbert’s axiomatic method into a general logical part – which they openly approved – and the concrete claims that a par​ticular axiom system revealed a pre-established harmony – which they rejected as mysticism. The present section investigates the element in Hilbert’s axiomatic method which defies such separation and accordingly was most suspicious to Logical Empiricists. 
In all of Hilbert’s axiomatizations and also in the Sixth Problem not all axioms stand on a par, as Hahn’s conception of axiomatics suggested; some are rather specializations of a very general framework. This becomes clearer in “Axiomatic Thought” where Hilbert explicitly chooses a bottom-up approach. We start with a certain domain of facts, e.g., mechanics, statics, the theory of money, Galois theory, which are capable of being ordered into a certain frame​work [Fachwerk] of concepts and their logical relations which is not external to this field of knowledge, but “is nothing other than the theory of the field of knowledge.” ​[58]​ Now Hilbert touches upon what Mach had deemed impossible, the need to ground or even “prove” the fundamental propositions (the basic empirical facts) themselves, the parallelogram of forces, the Lagrangian equa​tions of motions, the laws of arithmetical calculations. To be sure, Hilbert does not relapse into seeking an absolute foundation in intuitively true basic axioms, for these reductions 
are not in themselves proofs, but basically only make it possible to trace things back to certain deeper propositions, which in turn now to be regarded as new axioms … The actual axioms of geometry, arithmetic, statics, mechanics, radiation theory, or thermo​dy​namics arose in this way … The procedure of the axiomatic method, as is expressed here, amounts to deepening the foundations of the individual domains of knowledge – a deep​ening that is necessary for every edifice that one wishes to expand and to build higher while preserving its stability.​[59]​
At the end of the paper, Hilbert is very optimistic about the prospects of his program.
Once it has become sufficiently mature for the formation of a theory, anything which can at all be the object of scientific thought succumbs to the axiomatic method and conse​quentially to mathematics. By penetrating into deeper levels of axioms … we also gain deeper insight into the essence of scientific thought and become more and more conscious of the unity of our knowledge. Under the banner of the axiomatic method, mathematics appears to be destined to a leading role in all science.​[60]​ 
To be sure, Hahn and Frank could happily applaud to this unification as long as the “leading role” of mathematics was of an epistemological kind. The strict sep​aration between mathematics and the sciences was observed when investigating the independence of the axioms, when proving their internal consistency relative to the consistency of arithmetic by defining appropriate number fields, and when checking that the propositions of a physical axiom system do “not contradict the propositions of a neighbouring field of knowledge” ​[61]​ – both empirically and theo​retically. But what about “deepening the foundations”?
In elucidating this process which succeeds the analysis of the axioms’ mutual dependence, Hilbert deliberately combines examples from pure mathematics and physics among which I can make out at least eight (not necessarily disjoint) types. The first four of them are unproblematic for the Logical Empiricists. But the second four spoil the strict distinction between tautologous mathematics and empirical facts; they can be seen as a more precise version of Hilbert’s (non-Leibnizian) pre-established harmony. (i) There is a deepening by elimination of dependent concepts. If one axiom is a logical consequence of others, it can simply be dropped; for instance, the axiom of the existence of roots of Galois equations which follows from deeper axioms of arithmetic. (ii) Deepening is achieved by conceptual simplification. Hilbert lauds both Boltzmann and Hertz for having deepened the foundations of Lagrange’s mechanics containing arbi​trary forces and constraints (Verbindungen) to either arbitrary forces without constraints or arbitrary constraints without forces. But simplicity is ambiguous. Boltzmann himself opted against Hertz’s approach because it was very difficult to find those supplementary conditions which made it at all applicable.​[62]​ Con​ceptual simplification might also involve the introduction of new concepts, as is the case in the following categories. (iii) If axioms are independent one might also consider a whole class of alternative axiom systems and try to achieve – on this more general level – a connection with a neighboring discipline, even before this generalization could itself be grounded in a deeper level. One possible example is Cauchy’s introduction of complex paths of integration, which Hilbert had discussed in the “Problems”.​[63]​ Deepening here follows from the internal unity of mathematics in a non-reductive way. (iv) Deepening the purely mathe​matical foundations might yield concepts that are physically more fundamental, such as non-Euclidean geometries or if the quantity of action would acquire a core physical meaning. Hilbert’s most recent deepening in 1930 was this: “I had developed the theory of infinitely many variables from pure mathematical inter​est, and had even used the term spectral analysis, without any inkling that one day it would be realized in the actual spectrum of physics.” ​[64]​ Both linear operators (to become the quantum mecha​nical observables) and atoms are char​acterized by their spectra. Although Hilbert here refers to the notorious pre-established harmony, the mathematical deepen​ing has only a heuristic value for judging what is the physically deeper level. 
In the remaining four classes this separation between mathematics and physics becomes blurred. (v) According to Majer, in his lectures on classical mechanics Hilbert argued that 
[t]he whole of physics shall be set up on the basis of one fun​da​mental principle – for example the principles of Hamilton-Jacobi or of Gauss or of Hertz – by combining two modes of division or classifi​cation of material systems. (1) The number of mass points respec​tively particles to be considered is exactly one, many or infinite. (2) Different types of relative motions of mass points are to be distinguished: rest, constant relative velocities (all the same or different), ac​celerations of different types, linear, circular, etc., and their combinations.​[65]​
Hilbert’s set-up amounts to a deepening of the scientific foundations by a mathematically guided reordering of the classes of possible physical systems. (vi) Deepening of a physical theory might deliberately involve a mathematically deeper level. By “invoking the theorem that the continuum can be well-ordered, Hamel has shown … that, in the foundation of statics, the axiom of continuity is necessary for the proof of the theorem of the parallelogram of forces – at least given the most obvious choice of the other axioms.” ​[66]​ Hilbert advocates this type of deepening even at the price of obtaining a physically non-standard formula​tion, which confirms physicists’ prejudice that mathematicians’ deepen​ing is rather academic at places. 
The axioms of classical mechanics can be deepened if, using the axiom of continuity, one imagines continuous motions to be decomposed into small uniform rectilinear motions caused by discrete impulses and following one another in rapid succession. One then applies Bertrand’s maximum principle as the essential axiom of mechanics, according to which the motion that actually occurs after each impulse is that which always maximizes the kinetic energy of the system with respect to all motions that are compatible with the law of the conservation of energy.​[67]​
(vii) Hilbert treats deepening as a kind of scientific interpretation of mathematics which gives rise to an empirical verification of basic geometrical concepts. In the Foundations of Geometry he had proven that the Archimedean axiom is inde​pendent of all the other axioms. 
[This is] of capital interest for physics as well, for it leads to the following result: the fact that by adjoining terrestrial distances to one another we can achieve the dimensions and distances of bodies in outer space (that is, that we can measure heavenly distances with an earthly yardstick) … The validity of the Archimedean axiom in nature stands in just as much need of confirmation by experiment as does, for instance, the familiar proposition about the sum of the angles of a triangle.​[68]​ 
One might consider this as a geometrical version of the cosmological principle connecting local earthbound physics with the laws of the entire Universe. Hilbert moves on to a stronger type of continuity.
In general, I should like to formulate the axiom of continuity in physics as follows: “If for the validity of a proposition [Aussage] of physics we prescribe an arbitrary degree of accuracy, then it is possible to indicate small regions within which the presuppositions that have been made for the proposition may vary freely, without the deviation of the pro​position exceeding the prescribed degree of accuracy.” This axiom basically does nothing more than express something that already lies in the essence of experiment; it is constant​ly presupposed by the physicists, although it has not previously been formulated.​[69]​
Unfortunately, Hilbert’s axiom of measurement is at the same time too deep to be suitable for any specific physical theory and too restrictive because it a priori excludes chaotic systems. If we interpret the term proposition as the value ascription in a measurement “F has value f” the axiom is just fine and expresses the continuity presupposed when reading the pointer of a measurement device, but if we are interested in propositions like “F remains within the range [f,g] for all times” the axiom excludes chaotic systems for which there exists a time at which they leave any region even for the slightest variation of the “presup​po​si​tions”. To be sure, experiments with chaotic systems have their peculiarities, but it appears to me unwise to exclude them a priori. As in the case of Hilbert’s plea against infinities, we notice the risks of positing mathematically motivated axioms in physics. (viii) When applying the concept of invariance to relativity theory in his “Foundations of Physics”, Hilbert had intended to reduce physical concepts to mathematical ones.​[70]​ Although he had to take back parts of his claim, the action principle formulation of general relativity represents an impor​tant insight. 
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